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Abstract
Johann Arnason’s exploration of the historical constellation of East Asia has helped
reproblematize the conceptual framework of modernity and civilization. This article
outlines Arnason’s innovations in civilizational analysis and social theory in the field of
comparative studies of Japan. It sets out the terms on which a nuanced elaboration of
Arnason’s framework could occur. Two areas warrant closer attention: state
formation and the institution of capitalism. It is argued that there are signs of what
might be termed a ‘tertiary’ phase of state formation, implicit in Arnason’s discussion
of advanced modernity. Moreover, this phase brought Japan into close contact with
the newly unfolding context of the West’s civilizational imaginary, particularly in its
ideological expressions of evolutionism. The article ends on the problematic of
capitalism, raising questions about further potential theoretical developments based
on Arnason’s conclusions and other inventive studies of Japanese capitalism.
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Johann Arnason’s social theory of Japan is truly one of the most comprehensive
enterprises in the study of Asian modernities. An evaluation could start with his perspec-
tives on Orientalism, on state formation in archaic and feudal Japan, the place that the
Japanese example takes in a post-Weberian comparative analysis, or a general consider-
ation of the relevance and applicability of Western social theories in other civilizational
contexts. His deep investigation and core statements are contained in Social Theory and
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Japanese Experience (1997, henceforth Social Theory) and The Peripheral Centre
(2002). A short account of how he came to have an interest in Japan may help explain
the choice of theme that this article opts for: modernity and civilization. From earlier
work on Marxism, phenomenology and Eliasian and Weberian legacies, Arnason began
to elaborate a multidimensional conception of modernity. In the Japanese context, this
was expressed as a sharp critique of the metanarrative of modernization (1987). A frame-
work of post-Weberianism provided an initial springboard for his major work, namely
Social Theory. This was a hermeneutical project critically drawing on Weber, Castoria-
dis, Merleau-Ponty, Benjamin Nelson and Elias, and secondarily from Mann, Marx,
Durkheim, Mauss and Le´vi-Strauss. Furthermore, it has been nourished by critical
dialogue with Eisenstadt’s landmark work in the comparative sociology of Japan.1 With
Social Theory, Arnason began to declare a series of positions on questions of debate in
the emerging paradigm of civilizational sociology, not the least of which is a post-
colonial critique of Orientalism. Arnason’s response to post-colonial critics is to develop
a perspective that privileges the contexts of intercivilizational encounters. However,
Arnason’s writings on Japan go beyond simply another study of another non-Western
figuration. It works from the clarification of concepts and aims for further theoretical
elaboration. Moreover, it is part of an emerging conceptual apparatus that is still a
work-in-progress.
This article centers on Arnason’s rethinking of the concept of modernity in respect to
Japanese civilization in order to establish the groundwork upon which his achievements
can be expanded. It takes up six problems: regionalism and civilization in East Asia, the
categories of culture and power, Japan’s distinctive modernity, sequences of state forma-
tion, and a hermeneutics of intercivilizational encounters. A final section hones in on
debates around capitalism to see where future research could develop.
Culture and power re-made: thinking about civilization in
context
Japan is the first case in which Arnason applies two of his main theoretical innovations in
order to further a civilizational paradigm: his insistence that civilizations be studied in
context and the reformulation of notions of culture and power. Each is discussed in turn
in this section.
Context is all important in thinking about how modernity and civilization can be
related to one another. Where Eisenstadt posits the ‘civilization of modernity’ as one
approach to this problem, Arnason sees civilizations as both less than and greater than
modernity. In short, this means that modernity always coalesces around civilizational
legacies which contextualize it and to which it is responsive. At the same time, moder-
nity’s spread is, in every sense, ‘trans-civilizational’. It has the capacity to transform
those legacies. Setting modernity in civilizational context in this manner helps make
much better sense of the dialectic of universality and particularity. On one hand, it over-
comes the pitfalls of universalism that are frequently highlighted in critiques of conven-
tional theories of modernity, such as those of Habermas and Giddens. On the other hand,
it does not lapse into a decontextualized notion of plurality as a response to the critics of
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Eurocentrism. It aims, rather, to set the institution of modernity in civilizational
perspective.
This also produces a position on Eisenstadt’s problematic of ‘multiple modernities’.
The phrase itself is only used reluctantly by Arnason in a few places. Even so, the idea of
multiplicity is expressly accepted. There are ‘trajectories’ and ‘configurations’ of and
‘paths to’ modernity (2002: 132–57). There are delineable non-Western modernities and
an acknowledgement of a common ‘colonial modernity’ (2003: 324–5). Moreover,
Eisenstadt’s program does set out the dimensions of modernity’s pluralization (2003:
40–2). However, distinct caution remains about how the notion of multiple modernities
is conceptualized, especially as it is defined by the proposition that modernity itself is a
civilization. Eisenstadt puts at risk the valuable pluralism that he is seeking for civiliza-
tional sociology as the critical point of departure from the meta-narrative of moderniza-
tion. In conclusion, the research agenda of multiple modernities at this stage falls short of
the ‘more complex image of modernity’ (2007: 22) that it needs. Thus, for Arnason, vital
questions of this sort can be only systematically addressed through a focused examina-
tion of civilizations and modernities in context. This is less his ‘answer’ to Eisenstadt and
more a theoretical direction to follow.
He follows this subsequent course by singling out Japan’s historical experience from
the background of East Asia. Japan’s exceptionality can be established only in the context
of themore limited zone of historical China andKorea (2002: 45–53). A larger geographi-
calmodel provides less of a guide to the longue dure´e because it includes different kinds of
intercivilizational encounters and diverging experiences ofWestern colonialism (1997: 3,
43–7). FollowingMauss’ notion of the ‘singularization of societies’, he sets out how Japan
is a paradigmatic instance of self-particularization (1997; 2003: 299–301). Its transform-
ing relationship with the larger cultural exemplar enabled constant renovation of its own
traditions, some of which proved lasting. It demarcated itself as a civilization, which only
became completely evident with the nineteenth-century engagement with the West. But
the processes of self-distinction which saw its emergence as a vibrant and expanding
power had their origins in longer-term dynamic interaction with the rest of the Sinic zone.
One vital aspect of the discussion illustrates this point well. Japan’s relationship to the
world has been marked by a calculated calibration of openness and closure (1997: 368–
70, 408–10). A feature of Japanese modernity is the sharp distinction between makeovers
of Japanese identity and the adoption of aspects of outside models. It seems a paradox to
many sociologists that the sharpening of native identity can combine with a disposition
to learning. But this comes as no surprise to Arnason. It was a pattern acquired in the
ambivalent interstices of Japan’s long relationship to China. What marks it as a feature
of early modernity in the Tokugawa era is the shift from a regional to a worldwide orien-
tation, which began during the longest period of withdrawal. Thus, while the dramatic
relationship with the West opened more completely with the Meiji Restoration in
1868, it is during the Tokugawa dynasty that interest began to develop. This was a mod-
ernizing orientation, which confronted different exemplars of development. As it tran-
spired, the collision with the West induced Japan’s imperial project and later
developmental models. Both the empire and the postwar outgrowth of Japanese capital-
ism were reminiscent of prior engagements with China and were set in motion in East
Asia, albeit with Japan established as the region’s premier state and not its periphery.
Smith 3
The above discussion of modernity alludes to another of Arnason’s innovations. It is a
commonplace in the social sciences that culture is never completely isolated from power.
However, power is worked out in isolation from culture more often than many think.
Bringing the two dimensions together avoids the danger of reifying power present in, for
instance, Giddens’ and Elias’ theories (Arnason, 1989); that is, the neglect of an inter-
pretive dimension varying the structuring of power. In the place of historical sociologies
of the quantitative variation of centralized resources of power, Arnason sees figurations
of power as mutually shaped by cultural visions and potential resources. They have an
‘ambiguous relationship’ (1997: 9) in the development of modern Japanese civilization
and in the institution of industrial capitalism. His work finds real originality in the treat-
ment of this ambiguity. As highlighted above, external relationships often influence state
formation. He goes further than Nelson’s notion of ‘intercivilizational encounters’ in set-
ting out how culture and power form in mutually modifying patterns in the context of
Japan’s regional and global relationships (1997: 61–2, 195–201, 290–312).
Pinpointing those patterns sheds light on the turning points of Japan’s state formation.
Its formative seventh century involved the exercise of a locally developed vision of rule
stimulated by a wide-ranging pattern of learning from the example of China. This altered
the process of accumulation of power which was already underway and set a new course,
also initiating a first round of civilizational tradition-making. No center of authority
could be sustained, however. Disintegrative forces dissembled the ritsuryo state in a sec-
ondary process of state formation, dividing state power between the warrior government
and the imperial household. The inspiration of the imperial order endured although it
underwent a good deal of change in the twelfth century. A different synthesis of power
and culture is evident in the Tokugawa state (1997: 257–337). Crisis had led to contain-
ment in which achieving general stability became a priority. It was pursued through a
strategy of cooptation of elites rather than an out-and-out accumulation of resources.
Power was thereby consolidated in an arrangement quite different from that of Western
Europe. It occurred through a project of achieving a high standing and authority for
Tokugawa rule. The regime also adopted a cultural strategy of distant observation of the
world that was inseparable from this internal order. That stance towards the outside
world remained a defining one until the Meiji era when a different combination of cul-
ture and power emerged. I return to this subject in the section below after a short con-
sideration of the problematic of modernity made in the wake of these remarks on
culture and power in the Tokugawa era.
The problematization of modernity
Two essential revisions are visible inArnason’s notion of Japanesemodernity.Modernity’s
sequential development is reconsidered and its multidimensional form reconceived. This
amounts to a re-periodization of modernity which brings in earlier patterns of institutional
formation, alliedpolitical strategy-makingand interpretive realignments. Several subsidiary
a priori arguments are linked with both revisions.
Modernity’s discrete trends were therefore well developed before the nineteenth-
century encounter with theWest. The seventh-century formation of the ritsuryo state was
a watershed in this respect. However, Arnason is at pains to emphasize that this is an
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overarching cultural pattern open to many ideological interpretations.2 His approach is
unmistakably hermeneutical and is not seriously susceptible to accusations that it is a
thinly disguised kind of trans-historical culturalism. To sharpen his distinction between
cultural and interpretive patterns, he finely lays the groundwork for a hermeneutical
understanding of Japanese tradition through a lengthy consideration of Eisenstadt’s the-
ory of Axial breakthroughs across the span of Eurasia (1997: 61–74; 2002: 151–4).
Eisenstadt’s argument, in a few words, is that Japan as a non-Axial civilization did not
experience a sharp civilizational differentiation of the transcendental and the mundane
conceptions of existence. Consequently, its ontological orientation is radically this-
worldly and capable of immobilizing the universalistic tendencies of outside cultural
influences. This archaic core is a case of de-axialization. He argues this out in a way that
weakens the Sinic context so plainly influential in Japan’s entire historical background.
The result is an emphasis on cultural continuity rather than the vibrant reforming of col-
lective identity which is brought out in Arnason’s comparative analysis. Paradoxically,
the denial of recurring Chinese influence conceals what was a more indefinite relation-
ship to Axial traditions (1997: 131–4). If this is so, then the relationship to external tradi-
tions must be one of intermittent reinterpretation throughout history (as Arnason
suggests) rather than continuity of ontological orientations established in Ancient Japan
(as in Eisenstadt’s account).3 On this basis, Japan’s partition from the Axial civilizations
looks less clear-cut, as the connection to regional Axial examples is an abiding part of its
own past.
This returns us to the common metatheoretical theme of Arnason’s work singled out
in this section: the redefinition of modernity. In Arnason’s wider thinking, only a multi-
dimensional conception of modernity can provide support for his contexualized notion of
civilization and his incisive reformulations of the problem of culture and power. Further-
more, for Arnason, there are dimensions that should not be avoided: capitalism, revolu-
tion, nationalism and totalitarianism, and democracy. Social theory’s legacy of isolating
over-determinants (rationalization, differentiation, the spread of capitalism) mars its
results too greatly for Arnason’s liking (Kno¨bl, 2000: 13–18). Addressing the problem
of causality is not Arnason’s main purpose, however, as it cannot satisfy questions about
civilizational traditions and how social actors interpret them and thereby build social
worlds, institutions and states. The dimensions of comparative analysis weighed up by
sociologists act for Arnason primarily to stimulate questions about endogenous develop-
ments and intercivilizational encounters and this is what characteristically sets Arnason’s
multidimensional conception of modernity apart.
In the case of Japan, three aspects of its relationship to the outside world shaped its
pattern of advanced multdimensional modernity (2002: 139–48). First of all, it exhibits
a self-conscious search for technical knowledge which is elaborated as a strategy of
reflexive modernization. This involves cultural realignment neatly exemplified in the
Meiji-era slogan bunmei kaika (‘civilization and enlightenment’). The intercivilizational
exploration of other cultures that Japan’s leaders embarked upon in the early 1870s is
unmatched for the pace and depth of its exploration of the world around Japan. How
Arnason handles this episode is a showcase of his meta-theoretical modus operandi.
Social and political studies of Japanese modernization have a track record of privileging
learning-from-the-West as a cognitive force of modernizing. But expressing this as a
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modern Japanese search for world knowledge (based on pre-existing meta-cognitive
patterns), taken in a civilizational context, avoids the flaws of uncritically universalistic
analyses. While functionalist sociology, systems theory and comparative history all shed
light on Japan’s modernization, none give full due to the guiding civilizational pattern of
Japanese acquisition of knowledge and the dynamics of reinterpretation it contained. To
put this more pithily: Japan’s ‘historicity of modernity is irreducible to general models
and theories’ (2002: 141).
A second component is the remarkable construction ofMeiji state power. Little can bet-
ter sway the observer to the proposition that Japan was a counter-paradigm of Western
modernity more than a full appreciation of its modern state formation. In the next section,
I argue that this is an area in which Arnason’s analysis can be realigned and extended.
A succinct pre´cis of his comments on the institutionalization of state power prefaces the
position I take. The creation of a constitutional-bureaucratic state with a developmental
relationship to capital and industry is a time-honored topic in Japanese Studies. Even read-
ing this historical episode as a revolution-from-above serves to underline the individuality
ofMeiji Japan (1997: 412–22, 440–4). There is an abiding ideological side of its structure
that warrants more attention: its particularistic nationalism. When the interconnection of
culture and power is set in full view, some aspects of a nationalist imaginary come into
prominence. From the civilizational background of its relationship to China, the Meiji
nation derived a forcefully self-particularizing ethnic identity. It was resistant to the super-
seding impulses of Western influences. However, it was also remarkably adaptable and
internally differentiated. The nationalist imaginarywas open to different ideological inter-
pretations, some ideologically dominant, others oppositional. The latter have not been
given their due in the scholarship of Japanese nationalism. Arnason’s main insight comes
in at this point. Different modernities configure integrative and contestatory versions of
nationalism in varying ways. The underlying modern relationship between the Japanese
nation and state established a distinctly integrative pattern, which sits atop social and polit-
ical divisions and at the same time has acted to suppress them (1997: 446–9, 461–7).
Third, Japan’s civilizational background provided the pre-conditions of its excep-
tional modernity. The arrival of the Western powers in force in the nineteenth century
showed that East Asia was a region of variable patterns of self-transformation in circum-
stances of growing outside influence. Japan stood out as the most effective power in the
region, a situation that has unquestionably lasted until the 1980s. It also instituted pat-
terns of engagement with the outside world which have successfully established more
autonomy for Japan than the region’s other main states. Its historical relationship
entailed a creative adaptation of Chinese culture that reinforced native Japanese tradi-
tions. Foreign relations with Western powers were innovatively directed to purposes
developed by state elites in a manner that re-enacted important aspects of the long-
term relationship to the region, except this time on a worldwide scale and with a newly
renovated (‘restored’) imperial sovereignty.
Japan’s advanced modernity
The great encounter with theWest inaugurated an age of advanced modernity. Historians
have labeled this epoch as kindai (modern) to mark it out from the Tokugawa era, or
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kinsei (recent). Arnason rights this distinction, moderating its contrast by bringing two
earlier eras into full view. To do this, he tempers conventional emphases on the Meiji
upheaval and the twentieth century. This qualification is important to Arnason’s sense
of the longue dure´e, but it comes at a cost. Questions about contemporary Japan (gendai
to its historians) are raised and treated inconclusively. Moreover, their treatment is
detached to some degree from the main thrust of his civilizational sociology. Three
dimensions of Japan’s advanced modernity merit further elaboration: the third historic
phase of state formation, its confrontation withWestern imperialism’s civilizational ima-
ginary and the character of its capitalism.
Arnason’s thinking about the long-term impulses of Japanese state formation includes
a compelling distinction between primary and secondary processes (1996). In compara-
tive analysis, this refers to the initial materialization of large-scale states (as primary) and
re-institution of state structures against standing cultural traditions following a long
phase of disintegration (as secondary). Application of these categories to Japan requires
a number of revisions that reveal the startling complexity of developments. The subse-
quent Meiji era is deemed a major breakthrough (1997: 412–45, 449–53). I propose
going one step further and set out some reasons why it can be classed as a tertiary process
of state formation. In doing so, I am not claiming that Arnason has overlooked the detail
of the transformation or mistaken its novelty. It is clear that he fully appreciates, for
example, that there was no notable historical lag between the seizure of government and
subsequent social changes as there is in nearly all cases of Western revolutions (1997:
249–51). The issue is that it can be classified differently and the discussions around pri-
mary and secondary types of state formation suggest an inviting means of doing just that.
Arnason’s consideration of the general question of continuities from the commence-
ment of Meiji rule, through the Taisho interlude and the rise of ultra-nationalism and then
the postwar revival of Showa rule is instructive for what it includes and for what is under-
valued (1997: 404–7). It notes the watershed achievements of the Meiji emperorship.
These breakthroughs defined the horizon of possibilities, though the new regime did not
decisively pre-ordain particular outcomes. The most stable aspects need to be drawn out,
however. Continuity after the 1868 Restoration lies with the state’s overall institutional
order. While the 1870s represented a factionalized struggle for authority and a period of
some uncertainty, by the 1880s, a new polity was taking shape. It had created the chief
institutions of government with breathtaking speed. Despite its myth of archaic and
sacred connection to the Japanese world, the condensation of imperial sovereignty in the
Meiji polity was new. The figuration was subtly authoritarian and is often classed as an
oligarchic form of rule. Special constitutional veto powers were granted to the military,
giving it a privileged place in the polity. It was some decades before they were exercised,
but by the end of Meiji rule the potential for military ascendancy was clear. In the 1890s,
there was an immediate consequence: de facto decision-making fell to coalescing polit-
ical elites. This was a pattern that would persist, albeit under challenge, through the par-
tial democratization of parliamentary politics that occurred during the Taisho era.
No long-term breakdown in the state preceded the post-1868 upheaval of Japanese
society, as occurred in cases of secondary state formation. Nonetheless, there was a sig-
nificant crisis accelerated by the looming foreign presence. The sweeping creation of a
new state and the reconstruction of society (in both the institutions and minds of the
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Japanese) can be categorized as tertiary when one considers how widespread the
perception of crisis and change was among the population. The threat of more direct and
sustained foreign intervention had been rare in the Japanese experience and hastened
reunification. The brevity of this juncture and the drama of its political and social
changes justify characterizing it as a revolutionary process without any identifiable rev-
olutionary subject, or a radically novel mode of legitimation. Phenomenologically it can
be seen in those terms also; the onset of advanced modernity was experienced by the
Japanese as a colossal upheaval. In the 1870s, it opened up the question of broader pop-
ular participation in society and in the political community in the form of organic polit-
ical programs developed outside of the major urban centers. Certainly, these were only
short-lived. However, they briefly brought into focus a range of fundamental questions
about the character of Japanese society. In doing so, they played an important part in cul-
tivating a sense of modernity and historicity beyond the circles of reforming samurai
leaders and city-based intelligentsia. Any nascent political modernity was closed off
soon enough by the consolidation of political elites around the emperorship. But brief
episodes of involvement primed a number of communities for further institutional
changes.
The result was a ground-breaking polity which was conspicuously solid in its funda-
mentals and distinct from previous regimes. Of course, this might only be a new phase of
institutional formation that resulted from the fusion of the imperial institution with
domainal government. However, when it is linked with a second dimension of Japan’s
expanding modernity, additional reasons for demarcating a notion of tertiary formation
can be found. Orienting to this larger context of the world of empires exposed Japan to
the West’s civilizational imaginary and the evolutionist ideology of nations and races
derived from it. This involved more than adjustment to a newly revealed worldwide
interstate system with its own ground rules. The conceptual apparatus of civilizational
thinking included a hierarchy of regions and cultures, which imagined Japan at a level
unacceptably low to the Japanese. The Western empires’ strategies for different regions
were closely linked to this civilizational world-view. Japan’s urge for equality of its
nation and empire was no mere reactive strategy to increase power and influence in the
region, as Arnason indeed points out (1997: 482–3). It was also a general response to the
West’s own civilizational projections of a world re-ordered according to its image.
Japan’s visualization of the outside world was consequently magnified to encompass
other civilizations, states and regions. It was an imaginary reorientation of the soto-uchi
(outside/inside) ontological pattern which contextualized the institution of the imperial
state.4 Confrontation with the West’s civilizational imaginary thereby precipitated a
wide-ranging adjustment of perceptions of the relationship between domestic and for-
eign worlds at the heart of the Meiji transformation.
Stepping back momentarily to look at the trajectories of modern Western and
Japanese state formation will help illustrate how this warrants the designation of a ‘tertiary’
process of power formation.While the dichotomy of primary and secondary state forma-
tion suits the profile of long-term European patterns, there are several features of Meiji
Japan’s international relations which do not correlate as well. In this regard, the impact
of deep confrontation with pre-existing forms of Western imperialism and their shared
civilizational imaginary outlined above deserve more attention. For the West’s chief
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powers, the connection between secondary processes of state formation and the
outgrowth of their empires was closer. It was cemented in the long sixteenth century
in which the proto-oceanic states of Western Europe opened the Atlantic sphere while
simultaneously securing central authority in a so-called absolutist pattern. In Japan,
there is more distance between the Tokugawa regime’s struggles for unification around
the shogunate (which were taking effect at the start of this period) and the laterMeiji-era
reflexive engagement with modern imperialism (both in its Western varieties and the
later brief phase of self-reflection on its own project). The encounter with the West
included involvement in an international arena increasingly dominated by its expanding
world empires. For the Japanese, the ordering of the entire world in theWestern imperial
imagination and the empowered seaborne states that went with it had no exact precedent.
Japan’s rulers could observe institutional conglomerations that were both national and
imperial in their composition and logic and which held territories on each continent and
exerted influence beyond their colonial holdings. They provided not only themodels but
also the impetus for a potential Japanese counterpart. From their origins, the institutional
structures of theMeiji state were therefore readily adaptable to expansion, conquest and
export as well as nation-building.
Capitalism in the civilizational nation
This Meiji state also launched the most rapid and complete process of industrialization in
world history. Arnason has a distinct view of these developments and indeed a discrete
position in debates on historical capitalism (2001). His work re-developsWeber’s central
metaphor of a ‘spirit’ of capitalism through critical assessments of Braudel, Marx,
Deutschman, Elias, Polanyi, Boltanksi and Chiapello (2003: 206–9, 274–81; 2005).
Although a significant debt to Castoriadis is noted, it is the relationship of civilizational
heritages and capitalism (not a pressing concern for Castoriadis) which Arnason is inter-
ested in.
When it comes to Japan two essayistic chapters work with three additional themes
(1997: 475–502; 2003: 158–202). The first is Chalmers Johnson’s well-known analysis
of the capitalist developmental state, which is embraced and broadened in Arnason’s
work. In Arnason’s view, debates about Confucian traditions and capitalism reveal the
exceptionality of Japan’s ontological combinations, often against some of the claims that
are made in those debates. Third is the construction of rationality in economic life; its
imaginary appears as its eternal immanence – its laws as analogies of nature. This
has force for Japan as it did for Western modernity and rests on the longer-term impulses
of commercialization in the realm of material life.
Such comparison folds neatly into Arnason’s identification of the ‘elemental’ features
of the spirit of capitalism. Japan and the Western powers share the drive to accumulate
wealth through expansion and institutional consolidation. In one way, this is the imag-
ination of inexhaustible human potential exemplified by the spread of long-distance
transoceanic commerce by Europe’s empires. It is also found on a different path in
Japan’s state formation. Both are part of the abstracted ‘spirit’ of capitalism which is
adaptable to a variety of cultural environments.
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A secondary (‘composite’) spirit is more particular and follows different sequences of
development. A Western sequence began with mercantilism, generated a model of
entrepreneurialism in the liberal nineteenth century, and then another of Fordism in the
twentieth. Post-Fordist flexibilization has been in vogue since the 1980s. Japan’s progres-
sion followed an alternative path. The Meiji state inaugurated a developmentalist regime
that linked an orientation of technological growth and innovation to national goals.
The turn to imperial expansion geographically reconfigured the organization of
production and trade. Economic nationalism was common to this period and to postwar
reconstruction, a ‘successor spirit’ built up on the residue of previous early modern
conceptualizations of development.
No approach in Japanese Studies resembles this perspective. We have learnt from
Braudel, Baechler, Wallerstein and others to look further back if we really want to see
capitalism’s beginnings. Arnason does that in the case of Japan. Further research taking
this framework as a starting point could pick up neglected features. The ambivalent rela-
tionship with the United States should be treated as an intercivilizational encounter in its
own right. Mass industrialism and development of discipline in work contrast with the
predominance of small-scale organizations in the economy. Finally, patterns of con-
sumption reflect a phantasm of unlimited needs, which are in turn partly restrained by
other civilizational elements. The work of three scholars contributes much to a consid-
eration of research in each respective area: Walter LaFeber (1997), Tessa Morris-Suzuki
(1994) and John Clammer (1997).
Following LaFeber’s history, the mutually defining connection with the United States
can be characterized as a complex ‘clash’ that entailed an abiding mutual admiration. It
involved intercultural exchange and learning. Japan’s past experiences of world watch-
ing have been repeated in their constant observation of North American civilization;
likewise, the US has proved a keen Japan watcher. However, this was also a competition
of ‘models’ of capitalist development. It is in the realm of economic relations that the
adversarial and competitive side of their intercivilizational engagement is at its fiercest.
Its multifaceted relationships with Asian countries are relevant here. The rise of distinct
patterns of capitalist formation in Asia has occurred in the context of Japan’s ascendance
without necessarily following its developmental path. The consequence has been a stand-
off with the US in the 1990s. Neo-liberal remedies to financial systems that failed in
1997 are frequently juxtaposed to the region’s institutional orders, which were previ-
ously touted as the basis for initial waves of miraculous growth but recently disparaged
as ‘crony capitalism’. This is an instance of a tense trans-Pacific liaison altered by three
decades of underlying transformations that could be the subject of a civilizational-
sociological commentary.
The other problematics – the disciplinization of economic life and ongoing growth
driven by unrestrained consumption – continue what Castoriadis describes as capital-
ism’s imaginary signification of the rational mastery of infinite progress (2007). It
should be borne in mind that they are operative in specific institutional environments.
In this regard, some ontological aspects of Japanese experience limit incessant growth
in production and consumption and indeed set barriers to the commodification of life.
These stand as a corrective to Castoriadis’ image of capitalism. Therefore, further study
of Japanese capitalism in this vein should move with and against Castoriadis’ approach.
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The mass form of industry and the disciplinization of work drew on the
meta-cognitive dimension of Japanese experience, activated as its creative ‘vision of
technology’ (Morris-Suzuki, 1994). After the Pacific War, the country lay in a state of
utter ruin. Its national goal of immediate revival was declared: the imagination of tech-
nological take-off. The postwar model embodied technological development coupled
with state coordination of the acquisition of essential licenses from the US. It entrenched
invention and inventiveness as core disciplines of industrial organization and govern-
mental goal-setting. Although the benefits of the ‘asymmetrical trade’ in US patents and
licenses dried up long ago, the pattern of internal invention developed during that period
continues in the activity of Japanese firms in Asia (Katzenstein, 2003). Its high position
in world science should leave little doubt that there is substantial faculty for originality.
However, the other side to the ‘vision of technology’ has been the institutional contexts
in which it is embedded. The coupling of national aspiration with constant economic
renewal points to the vitality of public institutions at all levels in Japan’s networks of
innovation (Morris-Suzuki, 1994: 209–44).
The vision of technological takeoff is a concrete form of the capitalist imaginary. It
evidently ran up against internal limits in the 1990s. A second form emerged later in
postwar success. Prosperity meant that more and more areas of human experience could
be rendered as products and services. At first sight, Castoriadis’ proposition that capit-
alism produces unlimited needs as desires – just as it generates its own drive to infinite
accumulation – would seem applicable here. It has an integrating effect under the pres-
sures of massification, which enhances a sense of material security. This has certainly
been the case in postwar Japan. But since the 1970s, something else has happened.
Where a relative egalitarianism emerged in the workforce, consumption has been the
sphere in which the pattern is reversed. Citizens differentiate themselves by status and
taste. The range of consumer activities has spread out dramatically on the back of post-
war growth. The phase of greatest consumptive power (or ‘affluence’, if you will) coin-
cided with explosive growth of the so-called bubble economy in the 1980s. At this time a
mania for leisure engulfed Japanese consumers, who had previously denied themselves
during the boom years to serve the cause of national growth.
The prosperity of postwar Japan cultivated a sense of self-assurance in the 1980s.
There was an unprecedented growth in leisure. John Clammer’s anthropology of con-
sumption (1997) sheds light on this. However, it also sets it in perspective, while explor-
ing problems not considered in Arnason’s work. Patterns of consumption in Japan reveal
a growing world of leisure. But they also contain limits and spill over into spheres
through which the Japanese build social worlds alongside of the commodity form, but
also partly against it. Consumption is one means through which contemporary Japanese
now live out intensely inter-personal lives. In a society where work relentlessly demands
exertion, consumption acts as an outlet for phenomenal renewal. Gift-giving is a closely
related set of traditions and form of sociability. It regulates the everyday rhythms of reci-
procity and expresses formal obligation or friendship. Thus, it is ‘almost an index of mor-
ality’ (Clammer, 1997: 165) that grows on a base of pre-existing emotional structures,
which in a different framework might be called a profoundly this-worldly orientation.
Performance and presentation are esteemed in this environment. Consumption and the
rituals Japanese associate with it bring traditions of civility into conflict with the
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excesses generated by consumer capitalism. In such vectors of exchange, long-standing
aesthetics may reshape the commodity form in unexpected ways, even though they do
not countermand it.
In light of Clammer’s anthropology of consumption, some moderation of Castoriadis’
theory of the capitalist imaginary is called for. Civilizational patterns can temper the
imagination of endless consumption. Japanese consumers take part in a lively sociality
that has prominent precedents. To be sure, its patterns vary by age and gender. Important
to the current perspective, it includes limits and brings in the most abstracted conceptions
that emerge from Japanese experience, its ontology, if you will. A pertinent example is
the emergence of a mode of environmental consciousness, even if the connection of con-
temporary conservationism to background conceptions is not direct. The latter has been
mainly expressed in large consumer cooperative movements and through effective and
well-known local residents’ campaigns against pollution. These simultaneously seek a
livable environment and a higher quality of life. This kind of environmentalism springs
from the mundane sociality that Clammer’s anthropology describes. However, this may
not be its only source. The sacralization of nature is a common feature of Japan’s various
versions of Buddhism and was foremost in early modernity (Eisenstadt, 1996: 384–94).
It valorized the immanent world and the immediate environment. Its ethical expression
materializes in the ecological goals of consumer movements. They actively organize
cooperative networks that produce and distribute organic, low impact and unpolluted
goods. In doing so, they step outside of large-scale Japanese industrialism while mobi-
lizing a latent aesthetics of nature. Returning to Clammer’s sociology of consumption,
we can say that such temperaments are a kind of civility, a civilization of desires in the
service of an ontological comprehension of the world. Further research on this promises
a fascinating and productive prospect that could build on Arnason’s balance of traditions
and contingency.
Conclusion
Broadly, this article sets out potential elaboration of Arnason’s work on Japan in three
areas. Arnason’s account of modern state formation after the historic appearance of the
Western presence in East Asia is adjusted and augmented in order to categorize a third
phase. The terms on which the Japanese negotiated modernity are recast in this manner to
underline the early indeterminacy of internal changes (followed by institutional conso-
lidation) and, as a second area, confrontation with the looming horizon of the West’s
pre-existing civilizational imaginary. A third area of enhanced research is Japan’s
unmatched experience of industrialization involving its regional and Pacific relation-
ships, as well as the civilizational conditions and delimitations in which Japan’s ‘spirit
of capitalism’ has coalesced. Arnason’s regional contextualization of Japanese moder-
nity and civilization, with some adaptation, provides an excellent framework for
expanded sociological work on these three areas. Its re-theorization of aspects of the core
conceptual apparatus of civilizational sociology and the paradigm of multiple moder-
nities paves the way for further research on understated aspects of modern and contem-
porary Japan. Above all, it reveals a dimension that runs contrary to the received wisdom
of modernization studies, which is implicitly reproduced in the globalization paradigm:
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that Japan’s far-reaching closure came to an end with assimilation of the outside world,
which continued to power its renovation. Instead, Japan’s historical experience is shown
to be one of intense and self-transforming engagement with East Asian and then global
currents. Its diversified modernity has exhibited careful deliberation on internal and for-
eign worlds and the relationships between them, as well as homogenizing counter-
tendencies, a diversity whose maximal appreciation is found in Arnason’s social theory
of Japan.
Notes
1. This is a relationship examined in Smith (2002).
2. As a more general point, the elaboration in Arnason’s work of the distinctions between the
social imaginary, ideologies etched out of it, and the social actors involved responds well to
concerns about theories of modernity raised by Ibrahim Kaya (2004). Kaya’s notion of open-
ended modernity searches for greater explication of the many modes of interpretation: ‘it needs
to be shown that autonomy and mastery can be interpreted in multiple ways by different sub-
jects’ (2004: 44). I take this to be consistent with calls for sociological applications of these two
basic institutions of modernity discussed by Castoriadis. Kaya’s answer to this is a model of
multiple interpretations of both modernity (resting on civilizational traditions) and its cultural
worlds (which are distinct from civilizations). Arnason’s is a model of multidimensional mod-
ernities set against conditions of inter-civilizational engagement (which varies by degree, fre-
quency, character and results).
3. 3 Note, however, that Eisenstadt’s analysis has other merits. His description of Japanese ontol-
ogy is highly perceptive and could flourish in a more nuanced theoretical framework. Also,
while his proposition that outside influences are ‘de-axialized’ in the process of absorption is
open to substantial criticism, it has the value of identifying process and transformation.
Eisenstadt himself does not take the proposition too far and his comparative approach to Japan
from within a theory of Axial civilizations does not depend on it.
4. 4 Cullen’s imaginative recounting of Japan’s long modernity (2003) emphasizes the interplay
of processes of national unification and interaction with outside powers. For him, it is the
Tokugawa era which has been misjudged by historians. He presents a strong case for realigning
perceptions of Japan’s past. However, reevaluation on the basis of internal and external impulses
to change can and should also situate theMeiji era as a turning point in Japan’s relations with the
rest of the world.
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